

# HARDWARE CRYPTOCURRENCY WALLET SECURITY WITHIN COMMON CRITERIA FRAMEWORK

Yasir Emre BULUT

Dr. İsa SERTKAYA

2nd National Blockchain Workshop

Istanbul, Turkey, September 25-26, 2019



# SUMMARY

- Introduction
- Cryptocurrency Wallets
- Common Criteria
- Security Problem Definition
- Security Objectives
- Conclusion




# INTRODUCTION

- Bitcoin Paper
- Blockchain
- Distributed Ledger Technology
- Cryptocurrency
- Cryptocurrency Wallets
- Security: Private Keys
- Common Criteria Framework



# CRYPTOCURRENCY WALLETS


- Storing address, private-public key pairs
- Hot and Cold Wallets
- Paper Wallets
- Mobile Wallets
- Desktop Wallets
- Online Wallets
- Hardware Wallets






# WHY DO WE NEED CRYPTO WALLET?

- 2008 – Bitcoin
- Coins, Blockchain and Applications
- Solves Central Authority Problem
- Blockchain: Hash Function + Signature



Blockchain: Hash Function + Signature

**Security = Key Security**  
**WALLET**








# HARDWARE WALLETS



Wallet	Display	Connection	Case	Protection	Pinpad
Trezor One	128x64 pixels	USB	Plastic	-	2 buttons
Trezor T	Color Touchscreen	USB	Plastic	-	touchscreen
Ledger Nano S	250x30 pixels	USB	steel, plastic	Secure IC, tamper proof	2 buttons
Ledger Nano X	Monochrome	Bluetooth	Steel, plastic	Secure IC	2 buttons
Ledger Blue	Touchscreen	USB	zamak, plastic	secure IC, tamper proof	touchscreen
Keepkey	256x64 pixels	USB	Aluminum	-	one button
BitBox	Led Indicator	USB	plastic	-	one touch button
BC Vault	128x64 pixels	USB	plastic	-	4 way control pad
Coolwallet S	Monochrome	NFC, blue-tooth	plastic	Secure IC, tamper proof	one button





# COMMON CRITERIA

- Evaluation of IT Products
- Protection Profile
- Security Target
- Functional Testing
- Vulnerability Analysis



# PROBLEM DEFINITION

## Mt. Gox

Hack Dates: June 2011, February 2014

Amount Lost: 790,000+ BTC

## Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Wallet

Hack Date: March 1, 2012

Amount Lost: 43,000 BTC and then another 18,457 BTC

## Vulnerable Wallets

Hack Date: September 2012

Amount Lost: 24,000 BTC

## Millions of Losses

## Poloniex

Hack Date: March 4, 2014

## Bitstamp

Hack Date: January 2015

Amount Lost: 19,000 BTC

## Cryptsy

Hack Date: July 2014

Amount Lost: 13,000 BTC

## Bitfinex

Hack Date: August 2016

Amount Lost: 120,000 BTC

## QuadrigaCX

Shutdown: January 15, 2019

Amount Lost: Approximately \$190 million in BTC, ETH and CAD

...

<https://sleekarena.com/news/infographic-an-overview-of-compromised-bitcoin-exchange-events/>

Penetration testing and security

BLOG: OPINIONS

### Hacking the Bitcoin

Trending Topics:

27 August

## EXC

### Bitf

Andre

the er

stater

the gr

EXCLUSIV


A large number of security resear

Bitfi and John McAfee about the

The \$100K bounty offered appea

scenario. Bitfi states that "our se


So, here's the first vuln





# SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION


- Assets
- Assumptions
- Threats
- Organizational Security Policies (OSPs)





# SECURITY OBJECTIVES

- Security Objectives for TOE
- Security Objectives for Operational Environment





# MATCHING SECURITY PROBLEMS WITH OBJECTIVES

Attack	Threats	Assumptions and Policies	TOE Security Objectives	Prevention Methods
Hardware Attacks	T.Compromise T.UnauthorizedAccess T.ReverseEngineering T.Reflashing T.Replacing T.FakeAddress T.WeakAuthentication T.Eavesdropping T.DDoS T.InformationLeakage T.Hardware T.Malfunction T.UnauthorizedUpdate	A.SecurePlatform A.EducatedTrustedUsers A.SearchPoison A.Update	OT.Access, OT.ReverseEngineering, OT.FakeAddress, OT.Reflashing, OT.Replacing, OT.WeakAuthentication, OT.Eavesdropping, OT.Storage, OT.InformationLeakage, OT.Hardware, OT.Malfunction, OT.Audit, OT.KeyCompromise, OT.FailSecure, OT.Integrity, OE.DataImport, OE.Platform, OE.Users, OE.Components, OE.StrongAuth, OE.SafeSeed, OE.FakeAddress, OE.Update	Backup keys, passphrases or passwords Multi-signature mechanism Multi Keys in separate locations Tamper detection tamper resistance tamper response Isolated Private keys and seed Latest version of the wallet software Educated Users Strong Password No Public Source/Design info Address verification



# MATCHING SECURITY PROBLEMS WITH OBJECTIVES

Threats/Assumptions/OSPs	OT.Access	OT.ReverseEngineering	OT.FakeAddress	OT.Reflashing	OT.Replacing	OT.WeakAuthentication	OT.Eavesdropping	OT.Storage	OT.InformationLeakage	OT.Hardware	OT.Malfunction	OT.Audit	OT.KeyCompromise	OT.FailSecure	OT.Integrity
T.Compromise	✓	✓				✓			✓		✓				
T.UnauthorizedAccess	✓				✓	✓									
T.ReverseEngineering		✓				✓		✓							
T.Reflashing				✓											
T.Replacing					✓										
T.FakeAddress	✓		✓								✓				
T.WeakAuthentication	✓					✓					✓				
T.Eavesdropping							✓				✓	✓			✓
T.DDoS							✓				✓	✓			✓
T.InformationLeakage									✓						
T.Hardware										✓		✓		✓	✓
T.Malfunction											✓	✓		✓	✓
T.UnauthorizedUpdate	✓			✓				✓							✓
P.StrongAuth	✓					✓									
P.BackUp													✓		

Threats/Assumptions/OSPs	OE.DataImport	OE.Platform	OE.Users	OE.Components	OE.StrongAuth	OE.SafeSeed	OE.FakeAddress	OE.Update
T.Compromise					✓			
T.UnauthorizedAccess			✓			✓		
T.ReverseEngineering		✓		✓				
T.Reflashing		✓		✓				
T.Replacing			✓					
T.FakeAddress	✓	✓	✓	✓				
T.WeakAuthentication					✓			
T.Eavesdropping	✓		✓	✓				
T.DDoS			✓	✓				
T.InformationLeakage				✓				
T.Hardware								
T.Malfunction								
T.UnauthorizedUpdate								
A.SecurePlatform		✓						
A.EducatedTrustedUsers			✓					
A.SearchPoison			✓				✓	
A.Update								✓
P.SecurePIN					✓			
P.BackUp								



# CONCLUSION

- Attract Attention
- Focus on Standardized Framework
- Contribute Product Security
- Guide for Developers



**THANK YOU**